Reading Nietzsche's Philosophical Psychology

I have intended to read Mattia Riccardi's Nietzsche's Philosophical Psychology, ever since it came out in 2021 following a series of posts I made on this very subject in January 2020 (see here, here, and here).  It is an academic book and the headiness of its approach and the hefty price tag kept me more interested in other things until this year.  My daughter gifted it to me last December.  As I have said before, nothing says “Christmas” quite like a Nietzsche book!  I began reading it shortly before my mother died and only finished it a couple of months ago.  Then I had to digest it for a while.  But, finally, here is my review of this rewarding academic examination.

I found myself both intrigued and challenged by Riccardi's interpretation of Nietzsche’s ideas, particularly concerning consciousness, drives, affects, and the nature of the self, all of which I examined in my three previous blog posts.  As someone who has previously written about and studied Nietzsche’s psychological theories, I approached Riccardi’s work with a mixture of curiosity and critical engagement. My own blog posts have delved into many of the same themes that Riccardi examines.  His academic rigor and systematic approach, however, provide a fresh perspective that both complements and expands upon my earlier reflections.

Riccardi’s work is a detailed and thought-provoking study. His analysis of Nietzsche’s concept of drives, for instance, adds a layer of depth to my own discussions. Riccardi articulates that the fundamental 'activity pattern' of drives is their tendency to ‘exercise’ or ‘discharge’ their strength, linking this directly to Nietzsche’s notion of the Will to Power. He asserts that drives "have an urging character and aim at discharge," suggesting that this is the fundamental feature of drives. This refined understanding of drives as inherently oriented toward overcoming resistance enriches the more general explorations I’ve previously undertaken.

Riccardi’s distinction between drives and affects is particularly illuminating. Drawing on Nietzsche’s notebooks (always a dubious source but most academics quote them anyway), he contends that while drives are dispositional, affective states are episodic, the mechanism through which a drive’s perspective becomes manifest. This distinction, along with Riccardi's claim that "affective states mediate the discharge of the drive by adapting it to a given situation," adds significant clarity to Nietzsche’s complex psychological framework. My own writings have touched on the interplay between drives and affects, but Riccardi's thorough analysis provides a more detailed account of how these elements function in Nietzsche’s thought.

However, Riccardi's discussion about human consciousness, particularly his categorization of different types of consciousness, which Nietzsche probably did not intend, seems less convincing. The author's effort to fit Nietzsche into his own framework of (R)consciousness (reflective), (Q)consciousness (qualitative), and (P)consciousness (perceptual) feels somewhat misplaced, as if trying to impose a structure onto Nietzsche’s ideas that they were never meant to accommodate. Nietzsche’s skepticism of consciousness, as expressed in The Gay Science 354, where he refers to it as "the latest development of the organic, and hence also its most unfinished and unrobust feature," suggests that Nietzsche saw consciousness more as a problematic byproduct of socialization rather than something to be neatly categorized. Riccardi’s attempt to dissect and classify consciousness in this way risks losing sight of Nietzsche’s broader critique of consciousness as a flawed and often misleading aspect of human existence.

That is my only criticism of the book, however.  Where Riccardi's analysis truly shines is in his exploration of Nietzsche's conception of the self. He argues that Nietzsche rejects the idea of a unified, conscious self in favor of a 'bodily self' constituted by the interplay of drives. Riccardi’s interpretation of the self as a "regulative fiction," constructed by thought and lacking independent existence beyond the dynamics of drives, aligns closely with Nietzsche’s own skepticism about the notion of a stable, coherent identity. This complements my own writings, which have similarly emphasized the multiplicity and fluidity of the self in Nietzsche’s philosophy.

While I find Riccardi’s discussions of “consciousness” to be somewhat off the mark, his analysis of drives, affects, and the self offers valuable insights that both resonate with and expand upon the themes I’ve previously explored in my blog posts. Riccardi's work adds depth to the understanding of Nietzsche’s psychological theories, providing a detailed and rigorous examination that enriches the ongoing conversation about one of philosophy’s most enigmatic and profound thinkers.

Another major aspect of Riccardi’s analysis that both complements and expands upon my own work is his discussion of the relationship between drives and affective states. In my blog posts, I explored how Nietzsche understood the human psyche as fundamentally driven by a multiplicity of competing drives, each seeking expression and discharge in the form of action or thought. Riccardi builds on this general understanding, drawing a distinction between drives and the affective states they produce, which adds a layer of sophistication to the analysis.

Riccardi asserts that while drives are dispositional—meaning they are the underlying forces that continuously shape our inclinations and behaviors—affective states are episodic, manifesting as specific psychological episodes that reflect the perspective of the dominant drive at any given moment. He uses Nietzsche's notebooks to support this distinction: “Affects are a construction of the intellect, fabrication of causes which do not exist (Nietzsche's emphasis).” Riccardi further explains that “affective states mediate the discharge of the drive by adapting it to a given situation” (Riccardi's emphasis).  This interpretation suggests that affective states are not merely byproducts of drives but are necessary mechanisms and manifestations that allow drives to navigate and respond to the complexities of the external world.

This distinction between the dispositional nature of drives and the episodic nature of affective offers a more meaningful understanding of how Nietzsche believed the psyche operates. It highlights that drives are not simply blind forces pushing us towards action; rather, they are mediated by affective states that adapt to the specific circumstances we find ourselves in. This interpretation adds depth to the general exploration of drives I previously undertook, providing a clearer picture of how Nietzsche envisioned the interaction between our internal forces and the external environment.

Moreover, Riccardi’s analysis helps clarify the role of consciousness in this process. He argues that while drives operate largely unconsciously, affective states are often conscious, though not necessarily in a verbally articulated way. This means that our conscious experience is, to a significant extent, shaped by the affective states that arise from our drives, even if we are not fully aware of the underlying drives themselves. Riccardi’s interpretation thus supports Nietzsche’s claim that consciousness often obscures the true causal processes behind our actions, a point I have also touched on in my blog posts.

Part three of the book is entitled “The Upshot,” and offers Riccardi's best writing on Nietzsche's psychology.  In his chapter on "The Self," Riccardi’s analysis offers an expansion of my earlier explorations into Nietzsche's views on selfhood. In my blog posts, I discussed Nietzsche’s rejection of the traditional notion of a unified, coherent self, arguing instead that Nietzsche saw the self as a complex and dynamic interplay of multiple drives. Riccardi builds on this idea, arguing that Nietzsche’s concept of the self is not merely a metaphorical or poetic construct but is fundamentally rooted in his philosophical psychology.

Riccardi introduces what he calls the “Dependence Claim,” which posits that his so-called R-conscious self that we perceive is entirely dependent on the underlying bodily self constituted by our drives. Nietzsche, as Riccardi explains, did not believe in the existence of an R-conscious self that exists over and above the bodily self. Instead, Nietzsche saw the R-conscious self as a kind of illusion, a "regulative fiction" that we create to impose a sense of constancy and knowability onto the flux of our internal drives. Riccardi draws on Nietzsche’s notebooks to support this point, quoting: "I don’t concede that the 'I' is what thinks. Instead, I take the I itself to be a construction of thinking, of the same rank as 'matter', 'thing', 'substance', 'individual', 'purpose', 'number'; in other words, to be only a regulative fiction with the help of which a kind of constancy and thus 'knowability' is inserted into, invented into, a world of becoming."

This interpretation aligns closely with my earlier discussions on the fluidity and multiplicity of the self in Nietzsche’s philosophy. However, Riccardi takes it further by emphasizing how this constructed self is not just a theoretical idea but has practical implications for how we understand our own mental life. According to Riccardi, Nietzsche’s view is that our first-person perspective on our mental states is always just the perspective of a particular drive or set of drives. This means that what we often take to be our conscious self—our thoughts, feelings, and intentions—is actually just the surface manifestation of deeper, unconscious forces. Riccardi’s analysis here is particularly valuable because it highlights the extent to which Nietzsche believed our conscious self-understanding is limited and even deceptive.

Furthermore, Riccardi connects this understanding of the self to Nietzsche’s critique of socialization. He argues that because R-consciousness is a by-product of socialization, the drives that typically come to dominate our conscious self are those that are most conducive to communal life. In other words, the social drives—those that promote cooperation, conformity, and social harmony—tend to suppress the more aggressive, antisocial drives that would disrupt communal life. This insight adds a sociological dimension to Nietzsche’s psychology that is often overlooked, emphasizing how our sense of self is shaped not just by internal psychological dynamics but also by external social forces.

The book's analysis of the self in Nietzsche’s philosophy offers a significant expansion of my earlier work. By emphasizing the dependence of the R-conscious self on the bodily self and the role of socialization in shaping our drives, Riccardi provides a more comprehensive understanding of how Nietzsche viewed the self. His interpretation deepens our understanding of Nietzsche’s critique of the traditional concept of the self and highlights the ways in which our conscious self-understanding is both limited and socially conditioned. This analysis not only complements my previous discussions but also opens up new avenues for exploring Nietzsche’s thought.

Riccardi’s discussion of the will offers another significant contribution to Nietzschean scholarship, one that both complements and extends my own explorations. In my blog posts, I emphasized Nietzsche’s critique of the traditional notion of free will, highlighting his argument that what we consider to be acts of will are actually the result of underlying drives and instincts. Riccardi deepens this analysis by focusing on the specific nature of the will in Nietzsche’s thought, particularly in relation to the order and interaction of drives within the self.

Riccardi’s analysis in "The Will" chapter hinges on the idea that the strength of will is determined by the degree to which an individual can master and harmonize their various drives. He notes that Nietzsche views a strong will as the capacity to organize one’s drives in a stable hierarchy, allowing one to pursue and achieve one’s goals with consistency and determination. Conversely, a weak will is characterized by a lack of such internal order, where competing drives lead to contradictory, ineffective or even self-harming actions.

This interpretation expands the foundation I laid in my discussions of Nietzsche’s views on free will. Riccardi’s focus on the hierarchical organization of drives clarifies that, for Nietzsche, willpower is not about overcoming external obstacles but about achieving internal coherence among one’s drives. This internal coherence is what allows an individual to act with purpose and direction, rather than being pulled in different directions by conflicting impulses.

Riccardi’s emphasizes Nietzsche’s aphorism from The Gay Science 335—"We, however, want to become who we are—human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves!" (Nietzsche's emphasis). He argues that Nietzsche’s ideal of self-creation is intrinsically linked to the development of a strong will, understood as the capacity to impose order on one’s drives and to create one’s own values and goals. This self-creation is not an abstract or mystical process but a deeply practical one, rooted in the psychological dynamics of the will.

Furthermore, Riccardi’s interpretation also highlights the importance of self-knowledge in Nietzsche’s conception of the will. He argues that for Nietzsche, substantial self-knowledge is a prerequisite for self-legislation—that is, for the creation of one’s own values and goals. Without a deep understanding of one’s own drives and tendencies, one cannot hope to organize them effectively or to create a coherent and stable will. This emphasis on self-knowledge ties back to Nietzsche’s broader critique of consciousness and introspection, which Riccardi also explores in depth.

Riccardi’s analysis of the will in Nietzsche’s philosophy provides detailed and subtle account of how Nietzsche understood the dynamics of willpower. His focus on the hierarchical organization of drives and the role of self-knowledge in developing a strong will adds depth to our understanding of Nietzsche’s critique of free will and his ideal of self-creation. This interpretation not only enriches my earlier discussions but also offers new insights into the practical implications of Nietzsche’s thought for the development of individual agency and autonomy.

Riccardi’s exploration of Nietzsche’s conception of the ideal type and self-creation offers significant insights that expand upon my own interpretations. My blog posts delve into Nietzsche’s idea of becoming who one truly is by embracing and organizing one’s drives, but Riccardi takes this a step further by examining the structural and hierarchical elements of the self that make this possible.

Riccardi illustrates how Nietzsche’s ideal type is not merely a theoretical construct but has practical implications for how one lives. He discusses Nietzsche’s critique of moral universality, noting that Nietzsche believed that creating one’s own values and ideals requires an understanding that these values are not universally applicable. Instead, they are unique to the individual who creates them, rooted in their own drives and experiences. This aspect of Nietzsche’s thought resonates with my own reflections on the importance of individual authenticity and the rejection of externally imposed moral standards.

Moreover, Riccardi points toward Nietzsche’s notion of the ideal type involves a deep level of self-knowledge. He quotes from Daybreak 109: "However far a man may go in self-knowledge, nothing however can be more incomplete than his image of the totality of drives which constitute its being." Riccardi interprets this to mean that understanding oneself is a complex and ongoing process, one that is essential for the creation of a strong will and the pursuit of one’s goals. This process of self-discovery is what allows the ideal type to emerge, as it involves not only an understanding of one’s drives but also the ability to organize them in a way that reflects one’s true nature.

The scholar's analysis of Nietzsche’s ideal type addresses the practical aspects of self-creation and the importance of self-knowledge. His interpretation adds depth to our understanding of Nietzsche’s critique of moral universality and his vision of individual authenticity, offering valuable insights into how Nietzsche’s philosophy can be applied to the development of one’s own identity and values. This chapter, therefore, enriched my exploration of Nietzsche’s thought by highlighting the dynamic and personal nature of self-creation and the role of the will in achieving this ideal.  Riccardi’s examination of self-knowledge in Nietzsche’s philosophy, particularly elucidating that Nietzsche’s view is not merely an introspective exercise but is intimately tied to the understanding of others and the broader social context.

The author points out that Nietzsche sees self-knowledge as a secondary development, one that emerges after the ability to attribute mental states to others. This notion challenges the traditional view of introspection as the primary means of understanding oneself. Riccardi emphasizes that, for Nietzsche, the self is not an isolated entity but is shaped by social interactions and the need to navigate communal life. This perspective aligns with my reflections on the social dimension of consciousness, where self-knowledge is informed by the perspectives we adopt from others and the language we use to describe mental states.

Riccardi also explores the idea that the language-dependent framework we use for self-ascription often leads to falsification, a theme that resonates with my own discussions of the limitations of language in capturing the fluid and dynamic nature of our drives. He highlights Nietzsche’s critique of introspection, noting that the very language we use to describe our mental states imposes a rigid structure on what is inherently fluid and multifaceted. This critique adds depth to my exploration of Nietzsche’s views on consciousness, particularly his skepticism about the reliability of introspective self-knowledge.

Furthermore, Riccardi’s discussion of the connection between self-knowledge and self-legislation provides an important extension of my own ideas. He argues that for Nietzsche, substantial self-knowledge is a prerequisite for the creation of one’s own values and goals. Without a deep understanding of one’s drives and tendencies, one cannot effectively engage in the process of self-creation. This connection between self-knowledge and self-creation is a key insight that complements my reflections on the importance of authenticity and the rejection of externally imposed moral standards.

Riccardi’s analysis of self-knowledge in Nietzsche’s philosophy, therefore, offers a detailed account that both complements and expands my own work. His focus on the social and linguistic dimensions of self-knowledge provides valuable insights into the complexities of Nietzsche’s thought, highlighting the challenges and limitations of understanding oneself within the constraints of language and social interaction. This chapter enriches my exploration of Nietzsche’s ideas by emphasizing the dynamic interplay between self-knowledge, socialization, and the creation of one’s values and goals.

My exploration of Nietzsche's psychology, as outlined in my blog posts, has been both challenged and enriched by Riccardi's detailed analysis in Nietzsche's Philosophical Psychology. Riccardi's emphasis on the intricate role of drives, affective states, and the limitations of conscious self-knowledge expands on the foundation I laid in my own work. While I find his deep dive into the various forms of consciousness somewhat academic and potentially misaligned with Nietzsche's intent, it nonetheless provided valuable insights that helped refine my understanding.

Riccardi’s argument that drives are the bedrock of mental life and that self-knowledge is mediated through our understanding of others, aligns with and deepens my reflections on the social dimension of consciousness. His focus on the interplay between self-knowledge and self-legislation further enriches my exploration of Nietzsche’s philosophy, particularly the idea that the creation of one’s values requires an authentic understanding of oneself.

While Riccardi veers off in his own little world on the various types of consciousness, which I consider overly academic in a manner Nietzsche would have frowned upon and unnecessary to his central arguments, I benefited from reading this book. It expanded my own thoughts as expressed in my previous blog posts and is an essential read for those wishing to understand the basis for Nietzsche's psychology and, indeed, his whole philosophy to the extent that his philosophical ideas call for a psychological evaluation of ourselves and our society.

It enters into a terrific dialog with The Nietzschean Self by Paul Katsafanas (2016), which I used extensively in my posts on this subject.  While I don't always agree with Ricarrdi's critiques of the former work, I find that he enters into a discussion worth having.  It has expanded my thinking on the fascinating subject and is another fine example of how Nietzsche was as much a psychologist (a pioneer in the field actually!) as he was a philosopher.  Indeed, you cannot understand Nietzsche without relating to his writings with your own psychology and that of society's as whole.  Unsurprisingly, both works are published by Oxford Press, perhaps the finest publisher of thought-provoking works on Nietzsche's philosophy available in English.